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EDITORIAL COMMENTS
UNDERSTANDING THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE'S EFFECT
A few years after the Sabbatino case1 was decided, Louis Henkin demon-
strated that the act of state doctrine is a federal choice-of-law rule.2 He
showed that the effect of declining to apply it in any given case is simply to
remove it as the controlling choice-of-law rule. In the absence of a statutory
directive, the court would then use its normal choice-of-law approach to
select the governing law. It might look to international law principles, but
only insofar as they are incorporated into federal statutory or common law
in the United States, and only if the choice-of-law process selects U.S. law.
On the other hand, if the act of state doctrine is applied, its effect is either to
choose the foreign law and preempt any escape device, or-essentially the
same thing-to preclude the application of United States regulatory law
(such as U.S. antitrust law) to conduct that stems from a foreign governmen-
tal act.
Judges have not universally recognized Professor Henkin's insights.3
More than 20 years after Sabbatino was decided, courts in the United States
continue to misunderstand the effect of applying-or of deciding not to
apply-the act of state doctrine. Even the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, which hears a disproportionate number of act of state cases,
has not always worked deftly with the doctrine. Surprisingly, too, the De-
partment of State's Office of the Legal Adviser still displays an uncertain
grasp of the doctrine's effect. This state of affairs was illustrated again in
Chemical Bank II.4
Chemical Bank II arose out of the expropriation of Cuban Electric Co., a
Florida corporation that was headquartered and doing its business in Cuba.
The expropriation was one of a series directed against U.S. business inter-
ests in Cuba. Cuban Electric had outstanding debts to three New York
banks, which the Cuban Government did not pay. Either it assumed Cuban
Electric's debts and then refused to pay the American creditors, or it as-
'Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
'See Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175
(1967). As Chief Reporter of the revised Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, Profbissor Henkin
has continued to view the act of state doctrine, in most cases, as "a special rule of conflict of
laws." RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REvISED)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (REvisED)] §469 Reporters' Note 1 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986).
3 Nor have commentators, though they normally pay some deference to him. For a recent
critique of the doctrine's choice-of-law explanation, see Chow, Rethinking the At of State Doc-
trine: An Analysis in Terms of Jurisdiction to Prescribe, 62 WASH. L. REv. 397, 431-35 (1987).
Professor Chow gives only passing reference to the essential point that the doctrine is a federal
choice-of-law rule, superseding state choice of law even in diversity cases. Id. at 4 34-35 n.251.
His preferred rationale, however, is based on principles of legislative jurisdiction and turns out
to be basically a choice-of-law approach. Id. at 447-74.
4 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 822 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1987).
Chemical Bank I was an earlier appeal in the same case, 658 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1981).
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sumed only those debts the company owed to non-Americans. The three
New York banks also held deposits from some private Cuban banks that
were later nationalized. Banco Nacional, as the successor to the private
Cuban banks, sued the New York banks to recover the deposits. The New
York banks filed setoff counterclaims based on the amounts Cuban Electric
had owed them. They claimed, and the court agreed, that the counterclaims
were properly asserted against Banco Nacional, since it was the agent or
alter ego of the Cuban Government.
Banco Nacional relied on the act of state doctrine in defense to the
counterclaims. The Second Circuit's panel treated this not as a choice-of-law
issue, but as a question ofjusticiability. So did the State Department's Legal
Adviser, in a Bernstein letter to the court.' In a similar case, another panel
of the Second Circuit, having one member in common with the panel on
Chemical Bank II, had done the same thing.6
In both cases, the facts were found indistinguishable from those in the
Citibank case. 7 In Citibank the Supreme Court held the act of state doctrine
inapplicable, even though it could not muster a majority opinion to explain
why. Each of these cases involved a Bernstein letter, a counterclaim limited
to a setoff and no showing that examination of the Cuban Government's acts
would interfere with U.S. foreign relations. The absence of any of these
factors probably would have led to the opposite result.'
' A Bernstein letter is a letter from the Department of State saying that judicial examination
of the foreign government's act in the case at hand would not hamper the conduct of U.S.
foreign relations. See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maat-
schappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). The letter in Chemical Bank I1 disclaimed any interest in
having the act of state doctrine applied to the counterclaims, concluding that "the Department
of State does not perceive foreign relations difficulties that should bar adjudication of these
cases on the merits." The letter also said that the situation "does not compel us to call upon the
court to abstain from its normal duty to adjudicate cases properly before it." Chemical Bank I,
822 F.2d at 236.
6 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981). The
common member was the author of both opinions.
7First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
" A majority of the Justices in Citibank rejected the Bernstein letter as a controlling factor,
and an even greater majority declined to treat the limited counterclaim as significant. As for
the third factor, everyone concedes that the act of state doctrine applies if examination of the
foreign government's act, done within its own territory, would demonstrably impede the
conduct of foreign relations.
Another possible way around the act of state doctrine might have been to characterize
Cuba's repudiation or nonassumption of debts owed to U.S. interests as "private" or "commer-
cial." Cf Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). Quite
properly, the court in Chemical Bank II did not take this route. Cuba clearly made a political
decision not to pay U.S. creditors.
It could also have been argued that Cuba had taken property (the claims of the creditors)
situated outside Cuba, if the claims had their situs in New York. It is generally thought that the
act of state doctrine does not apply to takings of property outside the acting state's territory. See
RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 2, §469 Reporters' Note 4 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986). In
fact, though, Cuba did everything it needed to do within its own territory and effectively
blocked the creditors' claims. That should satisfy the territorial requirement, regardless of
where the debts had their technical "situs."
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Another panel of the Second Circuit demonstrated a far superior grasp of
the act of state doctrine's effect in the Lamborn case.' The doctrine was
interposed as a defense to a setoff counterclaim based on a Cuban expro-
priation, but there was no Bernstein letter. The panel applied the act of state
doctrine, treating it as a matter of federal substantive law to be applied on
the merits of the case. In effect, though not in so many words, the court used
the doctrine to choose Cuban law on the counterclaim.'" The Cuban ex-
propriation was "nonjusticiable" only in the very limited sense that an act
having the effect of law in Cuba was held not subject to judicial reexamina-
tion using some other body of law.
Once the court in Chemical Bank II had worked its way around the act of
state doctrine, it jumped to the conclusion that international law supplied
the rule of decision for the counterclaims. It did not stop to examine appli-
cable choice-of-law rules in the forum. Nor did it ask whether federal law in
the United States incorporates rules of international law governing the
conduct of foreign governments at home. Clearly, it was not applying inter-
national law as an international tribunal would. In fact, in purporting to
apply international law to the Cuban governmental conduct, it applied a
distinctly American brand of international law.
This last point-the likelihood that American judges would apply a paro-
chial version of international law to judge foreign acts of state--may have
been at the root of the Supreme Court's unwillingness in Sabbatino to en-
graft an international law exception onto the act of state doctrine." In
Chemical Bank II, the Second Circuit's panel fulfilled that prophecy by look-
ing almost entirely to United States sources for its holding that a state's
discriminatory conduct, nullifying the claims of foreign creditors, violates
international law.'
2
It is probable that an international tribunal would have reached the same
result, despite the paucity of international authority finding a violation
solely on the basis of discrimination against foreign nationals." Thus, the
' Empresa Cubana Exportadora, Inc. v. Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d 231, 238-39 (2d Cir.
1981).
0 Cf. Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918) (in an act of state case, the
action of the foreign government "must be accepted by our courts as a rule for their decision").
n See 376 U.S. at 433 (where the Supreme Court majority revealed a certain skepticism
regarding lower courts' ability in future cases to handle less clear violations ofinternational law
than occurred in Sabbatino itself.
," The court relied heavily on the Restatement (Second) and the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law (Revised). Both Restatements disclaim a parochial point of view, saying that they represent
"the opinion of The American Law Institute as to the rules that an international Pribunal would
apply if charged with deciding a controversy in accordance with international law." RESTATE.
MENT (REVISED), supra note 2, Introduction (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1984) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)). But as anyone who attended the ALI debates on the revised Restatement knows, the
Institute's opinion is shaped by the views and interests of its (American) members.
The court in Chemical Bank II cited only two non-American sources: a British scholar (B. A.
Wortley) and a 1931 arbitral award by the Mexican-U.S. General Claims Commission. The
point in the arbitral award on which the court relied was actually a quotation from an American
textbook, 1J. SUTHERLAND, LAW OF DAMAGES 126 (4th ed. 1916). See Dickson Car Wheel Co.
v. United Mexican States, 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 669, 681 (1931).
s Recent arbitral awards that have considered assertions of discriminatory taking or breach
of contract have found additional grounds for holding the governmental acts unlawful, or have
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point is not that the American court reached the wrong conclusion, but that
in reaching its conclusion it applied an Americanized version of interna-
tional law to the acts of a foreign government, without recognizing that it
had engaged in a choice-of-law process or that its application of the chosen
law was parochial.
When an American court applies U.S. law to the foreign acts of a foreign
government, and when that U.S. law has a strong regulatory character, a
jurisdiction-to-prescribe issue is presented. This, too, the panel in Chemical
Bank II failed to perceive. As in transnational antitrust cases, the court is
fashioning a remedy for conduct abroad by a non-U.S. national that is not
countenanced by U.S. standards. When the conduct is by a foreign govern-
ment rather than by a private cartel, the issue is all the more sensitive.' 4
As it did on the issue of discrimination, the panel in Chemical Bank II may
well have stumbled its way to a justifiable result on this point. This is pri-
marily because-as noted above-its conclusion on discrimination probably
would have been reached also by an international tribunal. The legitimacy
of a foreign government's complaint about the reach of U.S. prescriptive
jurisdiction is diluted, though not entirely eliminated, if the rule prescribed
is no more stringent than one an international tribunal would prescribe.
Arguably, the panel's result might also be supported by the rationale of
objective territoriality often used in international antitrust cases, since the
effects of the Cuban action were foreseeably felt by the banks in the United
States. This rationale, though, has its own parochial credentials. 5
Not only should U.S. courts, in applying or declining to apply the act of
state doctrine, reach justifiable results; they should know how they got there
and they should take a justifiable route to get there. The panel in Chemical
Bank II was lucky; it reached ajustifiable conclusion without betraying much




failed to find that there actually was discrimination against foreign nationals. See BP Explora-
tion Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 ILR 297, 329 (1979); Libyan American Oil
Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 20 ILM 1 (1981); Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Co., 21
ILM 976 (1982); American International Group, Inc. v. Iran, 4 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
REP. 96 (1983), 23 ILM 1 (1984); Liberian Eastern Timber Corp. v. Liberia, 26 ILM 647
(1987). Cf Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 178 RECUEIL DES COURS 9,
314-21 (1982 V).
Of course, the Cuban discrimination in Chemical Bank II was in the form of an uncompen-
sated deprivation of rights. Thus, the court did not have to rely solely on discrimination to find
an international law violation, but it did so nevertheless.
14 This point is more fully developed in Kirgis, Act of State Exceptions and Choice of Law, 44 U.
COLO. L. REV. 173, 182-85 (1972), and Addendum, id. at 379, 380-85 (1973). Cf Chow, supra
note 3, at 447-74.
15 See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 2, §402 comment d and Reporters' Note 2 (Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1985).
16 The approach outlined in this Comment should be applied even in a case involving the
Second Hickenlooper Amendment. The amendment, 22 U.S.C. §2370(e)(2) (1982), contains
its own choice of (U.S.) law but should be interpreted to apply only when a claim of title or
other right to property stems from a violation of "true" international law-not just of stand-
ards asserted by the United States Government. See Kirgis, supra note 14, at 181-82, 185-86.
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